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Abstract 
One of the unintended consequences of the New Public Management (NPM) in 
universities is often feared to be a division between elite institutions focused on research 
and large institutions with teaching missions. However, institutional isomorphisms 
provide counter-incentives. For example, university rankings focus on certain output 
parameters such as publications, but not on others (e.g., patents). In this study, we apply 
Gini coefficients to university rankings in order to assess whether universities are 
becoming more unequal, at the level of both the world and individual nations. Our results 
do not support the thesis that universities are becoming more unequal. If anything, we 
predominantly find homogenization, both at the level of the global comparisons and 
nationally. In a more restricted dataset (using only publications in the natural and life 
sciences), we find increasing inequality for those countries, which used NPM during the 
1990s, but not during the 2000s. Our findings suggest that increased output steering from 
the policy side leads to a global conformation to performance standards.  
 
1 Inequality among universities 
Universities have increasingly been subject to output performance evaluations and 
ranking assessments (Frey & Osterloh, 2002; Osterloh & Frey, 2008). Performance 
indicators are no longer deployed only to assess university departments in the context of 
specific disciplines, but increasingly also to assess entire universities across disciplinary 
divides (Leydesdorff, 2008). Well-known examples are the annual Shanghai ranking, the 
Times Higher Education Supplement ranking, and the Leiden ranking, but governments 
also collect data at the national level about how their academic institutions perform. 
Not unlike restaurant or school ratings, university rankings convey the fascination 
of numbers despite the ambiguity of what is measured. A variety of interests convene 
around these numbers. Rankings seem to allow university managers to assess their 
organisation’s performance, but also to advertise good results in order to attract 
additional resources. These extra resources can be better students, higher tuition fees, 
more productive researchers, additional funding, wider media exposure, or similar capital 
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increases. Rankings enable policy makers to assess national universities against 
international standards. Output indicators hold a promise of comparative performance 
measurement, suggesting opportunities to spur academic institutions to ever higher levels 
of production at ever reduced cost.  
With university rankings, the competitive performance logic of New Public 
Management (NPM) further permeated into the academic sector (Martin, 2009; Shimank, 
2005; Weingart & Maasen, 2007). The complex changes around NPM in the public 
sector involve a belief in privatisation (or contractual public-private partnerships) and 
quasi-market competition, an emphasis on efficiency and public service delivery with 
budgetary autonomy for service providers, with a shift from steering on (monetary) 
inputs to outputs, through key performance indicators and related audit practices (Power, 
2005; Hood & Peters, 2004). In the academic sector, NPM has expressed itself with 
reduced state regulation and mistrust of academic self-governance, insisting instead on 
external guidance of universities through their clients, under a more managerial regime 
stressing competition for students and research resources – although the precise mix of 
changes varies between countries (De Boer, Enders & Schimank, 2007). 
 The expansion of performance measurement in the academic sector has incited 
substantial debate. Obvious objections concern the adequacy of the indicators. For 
example, the Shanghai ranking was criticised for failing to address varying publication 
levels among different research fields (Van Raan, 2005). In response to this critique, the 
methodology of the Shanghai ranking was adjusted: one currently doubles the number of 
publications in the social sciences in order to compensate for differences in output levels 
between the social and natural sciences. Going even further, the Leiden ranking attempts 
to fine-tune output measurement by comparing publication output with average outputs 
per field (Centre for Science and Technology Studies, 2008).1 
 In this article we focus on the debate about the consequences rather than 
methodology of output measurement. There is a growing body of research pointing to 
unwanted side-effects of counting publications and citations for performance 
measurement. Weingart (2005) has documented cases of ritual compliance, e.g., with 
journals attempting to boost impact factors with irrelevant citations. Similar effects are 
the splitting of articles to the ‘smallest publishable unit’ or the alleged tendency of 
researchers to shift to research that produces a steady stream of publishable data. Similar 
objections have been raised against other attempts to stimulate research performance 
through a few key performance indicators. Schmoch and Schubert (2009) showed that 
such a reduction may impede rather than stimulate excellency in research. As such, these 
objections are similar to objections voiced against NPM in other policy sectors, such as 
police organisations shifting attention to crimes with ‘easy’ output measurement, e.g. 
intercepted kilos of drugs, or schools grooming students to perform well on tests only. 
The debate over advantages and disadvantages of NPM is by no means closed (Hood & 
Peters, 2004). 
 One of the contested issues in the rise of NPM at universities is whether the new 
assessment regime would lead to increased inequality among universities (Van Parijs, 
2009). According to the advocates of NPM, performance measurement spurs actors in the 
public sector into action. By making productivity visible, it becomes possible to compare 
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performance and make actors aware of their performance levels. This can be expected to 
generate improvements, either merely through heightened awareness and a sense of 
obligation to improve performance, or through pressure from the actors’ clients. 
 For example, by making the performance of schools visible, NPM claims that 
parents can make more informed choices about where to send their children. This 
transparency is expected to put pressure on under-performing schools. To stimulate actors 
even further, governments may tie the redistribution of resources to performance, as has 
been the case in the UK Research Assessment Exercises. The claim of NPM is that this 
stimulation of actors can be expected to improve the quality of public services and reduce 
costs. In the university sector, NPM promises more and better research at lower cost to 
the tax payer, in line with Adam Smith’s belief in the virtues of the free market. 
 Opponents to the expansion of NPM into the university sector point to a number 
of objections that echo those made in other NPM-stricken public sectors. This is not the 
place to provide a complete overview of the debate; suffice it to say that the inequality in 
performance in the academic sector has been a crucial issue. While proponents of 
comparative performance measurement claim that all actors in the system will be 
stimulated to improve their performance, opponents claim that this ignores the 
redistributive effects of NPM. By moving university performance in the direction of 
commodification, NPM could create the accumulation of resources in an elite layer of 
universities, generating inequalities through processes that also produce the Matthew 
effect (Merton, 1968). These authors stress the down sides of the US Ivy League 
universities, including the creation of old boys’ networks of graduates that produce an 
increasingly closed national elite, or the large inequalities of working conditions between 
elite and marginal universities.  
 In the same vein, critics claim that the aspirations of governments to have top-
ranking universities, such as Cambridge or Harvard, may lead to the creation of large sets 
of insignificant academic organisations, teaching universities or professional colleges, at 
the other end of the distribution. In the case of Germany, where there has been much 
debate on inequalities among universities as a result of changes in academic policy, it has 
been argued that output evaluation practices reproduce status hierarchies between 
universities, affecting opportunities to attract resources (Münch, 2008).2 In contrast to the 
belief in the general stimulation of actors, these critics appeal to a logic of resource 
concentration that is reminiscent of Marx’s critique of oligopolistic capitalism. 
 A third and more constructivist understanding of performance measurement 
suggests that major shifts in the university sector cannot be expected to lead to an overall 
increase in performance, nor a shift of resources, but rather a widespread attempt of 
actors to ‘perform performance’. If output is measured in terms of numbers of 
publications, then these numbers can be expected to increase, even at the expense of 
actual output: any activity that is not included in performance measurement will be 
abandoned in favour of producing good statistics. This reading of rankings considers 
them to be a force of performance homogenisation and control: a ‘McDonaldisation of 
universities’ (Ritzer, 1998), under a regime of ‘discipline and publish’ (Weingart & 
Maasen, 2007). These authors emphasize that the construction of academic actors who 
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monitor themselves via output indicators may have even more detrimental effects than 
the capital destruction that comes with concentration. Output measurement is regarded as 
mutilating the very academic quality it claims to measure, through a process of Weberian 
rationalisation or an even more surreptitious expansion of governmentality, as signalled 
by Foucault (Foucault, 1991). 
 Considering these serious potential consequences pointed out by the critics, there 
is surprisingly little systematic information on the changing inequalities among 
universities. Most of the debates rely on anecdotal evidence. Can one distinguish a top 
layer of increasingly elite universities that produce ever larger shares of science, at the 
expense of a dwindling tail of marginalized teaching universities? Ville et al. (2006) 
reported an opposite trend of equalization in research output among Australian 
universities (1992-2003) using Gini coefficients for the measurement. In this article, we 
use the Gini coefficient as an indicator for assessing the development of inequalities in 
academic output in terms of publications at the global level. The Gini measure of 
inequality is commonly used for the measurement of income inequalities and has 
intensively been used in scientometric research for the measurement of increasing (or 
decreasing) (in)equality (e.g., Bornmann et al., 2008; Cole et al., 1978; Danell, 2000; 
Frame et al., 1977; Persson & Melin, 1996; Stiftel et al., 2004; Zitt et al., 1999). Burrell 
(e.g., 1991) and Rousseau (e.g., 1992, 2001), among others, studied the properties of Gini 
in the bibliometric environment (cf. Atkinson, 1970). 
By providing a more systematic look at the distribution of publication outputs of 
universities and the potential shifts of these distributions over time, we hope to contribute 
with empirical data to the ongoing debate of the merits and drawbacks of comparative 
performance measurement in the university sector. Although we use indicators such as 
the Shanghai ranking or output measures in this article, we do not consider these to be 
unproblematic or desirable indicators of research performance. Rather, we want to 
investigate how the distribution of outputs between universities changes, irrespective of 
what these outputs represent in terms of the ‘quality’ of the universities under study. This 
implies that we do not want to take sides in the debate on the value of output 
measurement, but rather test the claims that are made about the effects of NPM in terms 
of the outputs it claims to stimulate. Which version is more plausible: the NPM argument 
of stimulated performance in line with Adam Smith, the fear of increasing elitism 
reminiscent of Marx’ logic of capital concentration, or the constructivist reading 
following Foucault’s spread of governmentality and discipline? 
2 Methods and data 
The Gini indicator is a measure of inequality in a distribution. It is commonly used to 
assess income inequalities of inhabitants or families in a country. Gini indicators play an 
important role in the redistributive policies of welfare states, e.g., to assess whether all 
layers of the population share in collective wealth increases (Timothy, 2005). They also 
play a key role in the debate about whether or not global inequalities are increasing 
(Dowrick & Akmai, 2006; Sala-i-Martin, 2006). In the case of income distributions, the 
Ginis of most Northern European countries are around 0.25 (Netherlands, Germany, 
Norway), while the Gini coefficient of the USA is 0.37. For Mexico—as an example of 
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the relatively unequal countries in Latin America—the Gini coefficient is 0.47 (Timothy, 
2005). 
 In order to calculate the Gini indicator, one orders the units of analysis—in our 
case, universities—from the lowest to highest output and plots a curve that shows the 
cumulative output: the first point in the plot corresponds to output of the smallest unit in 
these terms, the next is the smallest plus the one-but smallest, etc. This leads to the so-
called Lorenz curve. In a perfectly ‘equal’ system, all universities would contribute the 
same share to the overall output. In that case, the Lorenz curve would be a straight line. 
In the most extremely unequal system, all universities but one would produce zero 
publications. A single university would produce all publications in the system, and the 
Lorenz curve would follow the x-axis until this last point is reached. 
 
 
Figure 1 Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient. 
Based on this reasoning, the Gini coefficient measures the relative surface between the 
Lorenz curve and the straight line (Figure 1). The Gini coefficient can be formulated as 
follows (Buchan, 2002):  
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with n being the number of universities in the population and xi being the number of 
publications of the university with position i in the ranking. Hence, the Gini ranges 
between zero for a completely equal distribution and (n – 1)/n for a completely unequal 
distribution, approaching one for large populations. For comparison among smaller 
populations of varying size, this requires a normalisation that brings Gini coefficients for 
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all populations to the same maximum unity. The formula for this normalised Gini 
coefficient is: 
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 Although statistical in nature, the Gini index is a relatively simple and robust 
measure of inequality. However, there are some complications. First, the Gini coefficient 
is sensitive to tails at the top or bottom of the distribution. At the top end, the inclusion or 
omission of one more highly productive university would alter the Gini drastically. In our 
data, however, these top-universities are also the most visible ones (e.g., Harvard, Oxford, 
Tokyo) and hence such an omission is unlikely in this study. At the bottom of the range, 
the data contains long tails of universities with very small numbers of publications; 
relatively unknown institutions, often even hard to recognise as universities. This 
problem can be resolved by comparing only fixed ranges, for example, the top-500 most 
productive universities. For the world’s leading scientific countries this makes little 
difference. For example, our counts for the Shanghai ranking systematically include 12 of 
the 14 Dutch universities, 40 universities of some 120 universities in the UK and 159 of 
some 2000 universities and colleges for the USA. Nevertheless, this admittedly does 
exclude the very bottom of the range, and it may have an effect when we compare over 
time, as we shall see below for the case of China. 
 A second complication arises from double counts or alternate names of 
universities. For example, publications may be labelled as university or university 
medical centre publications; universities may change names over time, merge, or split. 
All of this creates larger or smaller units that will alter the distribution and hence the Gini. 
Therefore, it is important that publication data are carefully labelled, or at least 
consistently labelled over time. This requires a manual check. 
 Third, the Gini remains only a measure of overall inequality. This facilitates 
comparison from year to year, but the measure does not allow us to locate where changes 
in the distribution occur. To this end, Gini analysis can be complemented with 
comparisons of subset shares in overall output, such as the publication share of the top 
quartile or decile (10%) (cf. Plomp, 1990). 
 In order to calculate inequality among universities, we have first used the 
university output data provided by the Shanghai rankings at http://www.arwu.org. These 
rankings consist of a compounded indicator, with weighted contributions of total numbers 
of publications per university, awards won by employees of the university and alumni, 
and publications per researcher, in addition to numbers of highly cited publications and 
publications in Nature and Science by the top universities’ scientists. For presentation 
purposes, the ranking scores of universities are expressed as a percentage of the top 
university (Harvard), but for the calculation of Gini-coefficients this normalization does 
not make a difference.  
 The central part of the Shanghai ranking only pertains to the world’s top-50 
universities, but publication data is provided for a larger set of 500 universities covering 
the years 2003-2008. The data other than numbers of publications for these top-500 is 
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problematic because of cumulative scoring over years (e.g., for awards) or shifts in the 
data definition (e.g. inclusion of Fields awards in addition to Nobel Prizes). 
Unfortunately, the number of publications per scientist has also been adjusted during the 
series. The relevant definition is stable for the period 2005-2008. 
 Although this data provides us with a solid base for measuring inequalities, the 
time series is very short. For the precise ranking of each individual university in each 
year, the precision of total publications as a measure of productivity may be problematic. 
For our purposes, however, it makes little difference whether a specific university of—
say, Manchester—follows at position number 40 (in 2008) or 48 (in 2007). The focus is 
on the shape of the distribution. 
 In order to investigate longer-term trends, additional calculations were performed 
on Science Citation Index data. Our data comprise results for the natural sciences only, 
but allow us to analyse developments over a longer period (1990-2007). Following best 
practice in scientometrics, we used only citable items, that is, articles, reviews, and 
letters.3 More than 60% of the addresses are single occurrences; these include also 
addresses with typos. Using only the institutional addresses which occurred more than 
once—21,393 in 1990, but 46,339 in 2007—we removed all non-university organisations 
from the list and merged alternate names of the same universities. We included academic 
hospitals as separate organisations as part of our effort to limit manual intervention in the 
data to a minimum. For the analysis of shifts in the distribution over time, we believe that 
consistency is more important than debatable re-categorisations. 
 We should stress that our parameter, total SCI publications, can as much be 
considered as an indicator of size as of productivity. For example, at the top of our list is 
not Harvard, but the much larger University of Texas (see Table 1 for the top-50 largest 
universities in 2007). When we talk about the largest or the top universities, we refer to 
this measure of total SCI-covered publication output. We cannot make any claims about 
the long tail of small universities, but our analysis reaches as far down as Hunan 
University (532 SCI publications in 2007), St Louis (540 publications), or Bath (588 
publications). 
 
Institute Total Country 
Univ Texas 12047 USA 
Harvard Univ 11479 USA 
Univ Tokyo 7435 JAPAN 
Univ Toronto 7120 CANADA 
Univ Calif Los Angeles 6803 USA 
Univ Michigan 6603 USA 
Univ Washington 6348 USA 
Univ Illinois 5630 USA 
Kyoto Univ 5465 JAPAN 
Johns Hopkins Univ 5455 USA 
                                                 
3 On February 27, 2009, Thomson-Reuters ISI announced a reorganization of the database in October 2008 
(at http://isiwebofknowledge.com/products_tools/multidisciplinary/webofscience/cpci/usingproceedings/; 
Retrieved on March 11, 2009) . An additional category of citable “Proceedings Papers” is now 
distinguished on the Web-of-Science. Our data is not affected by this change since based on the CD-Rom 
versions of the Science Citation Index. 
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Stanford Univ 5447 USA 
Univ Pittsburgh 5442 USA 
Univ Wisconsin 5369 USA 
Univ Penn 4977 USA 
Univ Calif San Francisco 4962 USA 
Univ Calif Berkeley 4956 USA 
Univ Calif San Diego 4942 USA 
Univ Minnesota 4742 USA 
Seoul Natl Univ 4687 SOUTH KOREA 
Columbia Univ 4645 USA 
Univ Sao Paulo 4628 BRAZIL 
Duke Univ 4587 USA 
Tohoku Univ 4579 JAPAN 
Univ Florida 4450 USA 
Osaka Univ 4433 JAPAN 
Univ N Carolina 4406 USA 
Univ Calif Davis 4379 USA 
Ohio State Univ 4342 USA 
Univ Maryland 4283 USA 
Yale Univ 4195 USA 
Univ British Columbia 4094 CANADA 
Mcgill Univ 4048 CANADA 
Washington Univ 4036 USA 
Cornell Univ 4028 USA 
Univ Cambridge 4018 ENGLAND 
Univ Colorado 4007 USA 
Univ Oxford 3879 ENGLAND 
Mit 3850 USA 
Natl Taiwan Univ 3848 TAIWAN 
Penn State Univ 3654 USA 
Northwestern Univ 3621 USA 
Univ Helsinki 3515 FINLAND 
Vanderbilt Univ 3398 USA 
Natl Univ Singapore 3348 SINGAPORE 
Univ Paris 06 3289 FRANCE 
Univ Coll London 3255 ENGLAND 
Zhejiang Univ 3203 PEOPLES R CHINA 
Univ Alabama 3193 USA 
Univ Sydney 3184 AUSTRALIA 
Univ Melbourne 3170 AUSTRALIA 
 
Table 1 The 50 largest universities in the world in 2007, in terms of totals of SCI 
publications. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Inequality among the top-500 universities: Shanghai ranking data 
Gini coefficients for university publication output, based on the Shanghai ranking data, 
seem to remain stable between 2003 and 2008 (Figure 2). If anything, the overall 
inequality among universities decreases slightly. In any case, there is no indication of a 
significant and lasting increase in inequality as predicted on the basis of qualitative 
observations (e.g., Martin, 2009; Van Parijs, 2009, at p. 203). 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Avg 03-08 n
World 0.195 0.196 0.196 0.195 0.188 0.187 0.193 500
Australia 0.191 0.187 0.184 0.196 0.198 0.195 0.192 13
Canada 0.175 0.175 0.166 0.171 0.169 0.174 0.172 21
China 0.106 0.108 0.108 0.098 0.082 0.084 0.098 8
France 0.190 0.187 0.209 0.199 0.166 0.179 0.188 21
Germany 0.099 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.118 0.121 0.116 40
Italy 0.141 0.143 0.146 0.147 0.183 0.143 0.150 20
Japan 0.223 0.219 0.229 0.237 0.227 0.236 0.228 31
Netherlands 0.126 0.127 0.129 0.120 0.124 0.119 0.124 12
Sweden 0.122 0.120 0.121 0.121 0.132 0.134 0.125 10
UK 0.187 0.198 0.194 0.185 0.184 0.189 0.190 40
US 0.222 0.214 0.211 0.209 0.212 0.215 0.214 159
 
Table 2 Normalised Gini coefficients for university publication outputs. Source: 
Shanghai ranking data at http://www.arwu.org/. 
 
Figure 2 shows remarkable differences in inequality among national systems. Here, we 
have to proceed with some caution, as the bottom tail of least productive universities may 
not be included to the same extent for all nations. China, for example, presents a problem, 
because ten more universities entered the top-500 between 2003 and 2008. All our 
calculations were made with the largest available set for all the years involved. (Hence, n 
is the same for every year.) 
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Figure 2 Normalised Gini coefficients for university publication output. Source: 
Shanghai ranking at http://www.arwu.org/. 
 
Figure 2 shows a relative equality in the university systems of the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Germany. We must point out that this does not mean that all universities in the 
respective countries are equally ‘good’, but rather that these universities produce a 
relatively similar number of publications. Inversely, the relatively high inequalities in 
Japan, the UK, or the US could just as well be caused by large differences in the size of 
universities as of their productivity. 
 Perhaps more remarkably, we do not observe major shifts in inequality over time 
within each national system. This is especially interesting for countries such as the UK, 
where increased inequalities could have occurred due to the redistribution effects of the 
Research Assessment Exercises. These research assessments redistribute research 
resources to the more productive research units, while reducing the budgets of those that 
do poorly in the evaluations. France and Italy, both in the middle range, display one or 
two erratic results, which we fear may be due to data redefinitions. 
The lack of clear-cut increases in inequality among universities in terms of 
publication output raises further questions about productivity. What is happening to the 
outputs of publications per scientist? Because the use of the Gini coefficient is 
questionable here, as productivity data cannot be added meaningfully, we have used a 
simple standard deviation to measure dispersion. This is not quite the same as inequality, 
but does provide an indication of changes in the spread of productivity. The data is more 
irregular here, due to adjustments and improvements in the ranking data from year to year 
(Figure 3). Here too, one sees no clear sign of growing disparities among universities. 
The world trend seems slightly in favour of increasingly similar output levels 
(Leydesdorff & Wagner, 2009). Once again, the US ranks high in terms of spread in 
productivity levels, but Japan is now a member of the middle range. This implies that 
Japan may have a relatively large disparity between larger and smaller universities, but 
with more equal productivity levels. In the case of Australia, this difference is even larger, 
with the most equal distribution of productivity (Sdev = 3.7) among the other countries 
analysed, not considering China. 
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 2005 2006 2007 2008 Avg 05-
08 
n 
World 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.3 500 
Australia 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.7 13 
Canada 7.3 8.0 7.9 8.1 7.8 21 
China 3.0 3.5 2.2 2.3 2.7 8 
France 5.3 5.8 6.1 9.9 6.8 21 
Germany 4.9 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.1 40 
Italy 7.9 7.8 7.9 6.0 7.4 20 
Japan 6.2 6.2 5.9 6.2 6.1 31 
Netherlands 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 12 
Sweden 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 10 
UK 11.5 8.3 8.2 8.0 9.0 40 
US 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.4 12.3 159 
 
Table 3 Standard deviations for publication output per scientist. Source: Shanghai 
ranking data at http://www.arwu.org/. 
 
Figure 3 Standard deviations for top-500 universities: productivity in SCI 
publications per faculty. Source: Shanghai ranking data at http://www.arwu.org/. 
 
 Our results undermine the hypothesis of increasing inequalities among 
universities. If anything, we see a small decrease in output inequalities among 
universities, in terms of both overall output and productivity. This raises additional 
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questions. Is this result the product of the methodological flaws of the Shanghai ranking 
(Van Raan, 2005), even if one uses only its least problematic component, that is, 
publication data derived from the Science Citation Index? Might we have missed the 
increasing formation of super-universities because the time frame used was too narrow? 
In order to answer these longitudinal questions, we turned to data sets from the Science 
Citation Index (SCI) for earlier years. 
3.2 Inequality between universities: SCI data 
The 500 universities that publish most in the world, using the SCI, are becoming more 
equal in terms of their publication output. The trend is clear from 1990 to 2005 and 
continues thereafter for 2006 and 2007, confirming what we have found on the basis of 
the Shanghai ranking for a shorter time span (Figure 4). The relative position of the 
countries is similar to that in the Shanghai ranking, also confirming the measurement.  
 The trend per country shows a somewhat different picture. In the UK, the US, the 
Netherlands, Canada, and Australia, we see increases in inequality between 1990 and 
2005, although these seem to decrease for the first three of these countries during recent 
years. These are also the countries in which NPM has been picked up early. However, 
whereas the UK has attached a redistribution of resources to research assessment, other 
countries, such as the Netherlands, have not.  
 
Figure 4 Normalized Gini coefficients for top-500 universities. Source: SCI, n of 
publications (in brackets).4 
                                                 
4 The requirement to keep the number of universities per countries stable in order to calculate a comparable 
national Gini coefficient across the years led in the case of China to using a cut-off point of 28 universities 
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 France, Italy, and Japan show a stable distribution of outputs, while there is a 
trend toward more equality in China, Germany, and Sweden, although with some erratic 
movement in the latter case. Although the overall image is consistent with the above 
results using data from the Shanghai rankings, the country patterns are different. 
However, these differences in trends are mainly the result of the expanded time horizon. 
For recent years at least the direction of the country trends is consistent with the Shanghai 
findings. Note that in all cases, the inequalities measured in the SCI are considerably 
larger than using the Shanghai ranking, which suggests that the natural sciences are more 
unequally distributed than the social sciences because the latter are included in the 
Shanghai ranking and not in the SCI data. 
 
Figure 5 Lorenz curves SCI publications 500 largest universities. Source: SCI. 
 
 The Lorenz curves (Figure 5) show first the expansion of the database during the 
period under study. The 500 largest universities have increased their numbers of SCI 
publications, accordingly, from just under 400,000 in 1990 to almost 800,000 
publications per year in 2007. This figure provides us with an impression of the evolution 
of the distribution, but in order to obtain a more precise understanding, we need to 
analyse the distributions in more detail. 
3.3 Details of the distribution 
Since much of the policy debate around rankings concerns aspirations to perform like the 
international top-universities, it is interesting to look in more detail at what the largest 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the years 2005-2007, disregarding the earlier presence of three Chinese universities among the top-500 
in 1990, five in 1995, and sixteen in 2000. 
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universities are doing. To this end, we analysed the shares of total publications produced 
by every quarter, every tenth (decile), and every hundredth section of the distribution. We 
report the deciles here, as they provide the clearest indication of where the distribution is 
shifting (Table 4). 
 The top decile of universities is very slowly but steadily loosing ground in terms 
of output share. Whereas the 50 largest universities produced 34.4% of all SCI 
publications in the world in 1990, this share had decreased to 30.3% in 2007. This is not 
exactly a landslide, but in any case not an indication of a stronger oligopolistic 
concentration. Combined, the bottom half of the distribution has increased its share from 
a fifth (20.6%) to almost a quarter (24.0%) of the top-500 output (Figure 6). 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007
2007-
1990 
D1 2.9% 2.9% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 3.5% 0.7% 
D2 3.3% 3.4% 3.7% 3.9% 4.0% 4.1% 0.8% 
D3 3.9% 4.0% 4.4% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 0.8% 
D4 4.7% 4.9% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.4% 0.7% 
D5 5.9% 6.0% 6.2% 6.4% 6.2% 6.3% 0.4% 
D6 7.3% 7.3% 7.6% 7.6% 7.5% 7.7% 0.4% 
D7 9.0% 9.2% 9.5% 9.6% 9.4% 9.5% 0.5% 
D8 11.8% 12.1% 12.4% 12.1% 12.2% 12.2% 0.4% 
D9 16.9% 17.0% 16.6% 16.4% 16.6% 16.2% -0.6% 
D10 34.4% 33.1% 31.1% 30.8% 30.8% 30.3% -4.1% 
Tot 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
 
Table 4 Decile shares of the top-500 universities. Source: SCI. 
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Figure 6 Cumulative decile shares in total SCI output top-500 universities. 
 
 A detailed analysis of the top ten percentiles showed that the decreasing share of 
the top decile was shared throughout the fifty largest universities and strongest in the top 
percentiles. Among the 100 largest universities, the Gini coefficient has decreased from 
0.230 to 0.211 between 1990 and 2007. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Our results suggest an ongoing homogenization in terms of publication and productivity 
patterns among the top-500 universities in the world. Especially, the fifty largest 
universities are slowly loosing ground, while the lowest half of the top-500 catches up. 
All of this occurs against the background of rising output in all sections, and further 
expansion of the ISI-databases. In summary, it appears that the gap between the largest 
universities and the rest is closing rather than widening. Note that the top-500 universities 
are concentrated in North America, Western Europe and some Asian countries 
(Leydesdorff & Wagner, 2008). Within this set, we found increasing inequality in some 
countries between 1990 and 2005 using the SCI data, notably in the Anglo-Saxon world. 
However, even in these countries the trend seems to reverse in more recent years. Using a 
similar methodology, Ville et al. (2006) found decreasing inequality in research outputs 
among Australian universities during the period 1992-2003 given relatively stable 
funding distributions within this country. 
 In terms of Marxist, neo-liberal, and Foucauldian accounts of NPM, these results 
seem to refute the thesis suggesting oligopolistic tendencies in the university system, at 
least in terms of output. Further studies would have to analyse whether this trend is also 
present in the inputs of universities, such as research budgets, number of faculty, or even 
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tuition fees. The Matthew effect, which generates concentration of reputation and 
resources in the case of individual scientists, if at all at work at the meso level of 
organisations, may have generated inequalities among universities in the past, but this 
process seems to have reached its limit. Perhaps the largest universities are now also 
facing disadvantages of scale. 
 The question remains whether the slow levelling off corroborates the idea that the 
neo-liberal logic of activation is responsible for this result, or whether the Foucauldian 
reading carries more weight. There are indications that universities are indeed shifting 
their output more towards what is valued in the rankings and output indicators such as 
SCI publications. Leydesdorff and Meyer (2010) have observed that the increase in 
publication output may be achieved at the expense of patents output since approximately 
2000. The prevailing trend of levelling off of productivity differences in recent years also 
suggests that universities worldwide are conforming to isomorphic pressures of 
producing the same levels of SCI outputs. This further suggests that the self-monitoring 
of research actors increasingly follows the same global standards (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). 
There may be a price to pay for such higher output levels, apart from the family 
life of researchers. In the Netherlands, one witnesses a devaluation of publications in 
national journals for the social sciences, to the extent that several Dutch social science 
journals have recently ceased to exist because of a lack of good copy. Such trends have 
been criticised for undermining the contributions that the social sciences and humanities 
can make to national debates and public thought (Boomkens, 2008). Anecdotal evidence 
further suggests that researchers consciously shift to activities that produce a regular 
stream of publications, or that research evaluations may favour such research lines 
(Weingart, 2005; Laudel & Orrigi, 2006). Such evidence suggests that the slow levelling 
off of scientific output may not support the neo-liberal argument for increased 
competition at all. Rather, it suggests that researchers become better at ‘performing 
performance,’ i.e., the ritual production of output in order to score on performance 
indicators, even at the expense of the quality of one’s work. Further research about the 
effects of NPM on universities will have to provide more clarity on these issues. Hitherto, 
the NPM wave has been programmatically resilient against counter-indications such as 
unintended consequences (Hood & Peters, 2004). 
Whereas the inequality of scientific production has received scholarly attention in 
the past (Merton, 1968; Price, 1976), this discussion has focused mainly on the dynamics 
of reward structures of individuals and departments (Whitley, 1984). However, inequality 
at the institutional level of universities remains topical in the light of the NPM discussion 
(Martin, 2009). Our findings suggest that increased output steering from the policy side 
leads to a global conformity to performance standards, and thus tends to have 
unexpectedly an equalizing effect. Whether countries adopt NPM or other regimes to 
promote publication behavior (e.g., China) does not seem to play a crucial role in these 
dynamics. 
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